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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME 6 DECEMBER, 1951 NUMBER 1
FLORIDA'S NEW JUVENILE COURT ACT
ROGER J. WAYBRIGHT'
On October 1st Florida's new juvenile court act' became effective, gov-
erning the jurisdiction, procedure, personnel, and to a large extent the
financing, of the juvenile courts in each of the 67 counties of the state.
This comprehensive new law supersedes almost all of the statutory law
applying to juvenile courts which formerly was in effect, and represents a
rather complete overhaul of our forty year old system of handling delinquent
and neglected children.
Lawyers can perform a function useful to their clients, the courts and
the community under this new system, and consequently should become
familiar with its basic concepts and mechanics.
2
THE COURTS TO WHICH THE LAw APPLIES
The new juvenile court law governs the operation of every juvenile
court in Florida.3 Separate juvenile or juvenile and domestic relations courts
have been established by special acts in the counties of Broward, Dade, Du-
val, Hillsborough, Monroe, Orange, Pinellas and Polk. The law applies to
these, and to the juvenile courts presided over by the county judges in each
of the other 59 counties. It will apply to any separate juvenile courts which
may be created in the future by special acts of the legislature, and is so con-
structed as to be equally workable whether such new separate courts are
established for a single county or for a district composed of several counties.
Special acts establishing new separate juvenile courts, either for one
*A.B. 1934, Denison University; LL.B. 1936, University of Florida; Member of
Jacksonville, Florida Bar and Bar of Supreme Court of the United States; Member,
Executive Committee, Jacksonville Bar Association, 1946, 1948, 1951; Member, Board of
Governors of Florida Bar, 1950-1952; Member, Executive Board, Boys' Home Association
of Jacksonville, since 1940; Charter Member, Executive Board, Boy Service Council of
Jacksonville, since 1948; Chairman, Duval County Children's Committee, 1948-1950;
President, Council of Social Agencies of Duval County, 1950-1951; Chairman, Committee
on juvenile Delinquency of Florida State Bar Association, 1949-1950, and of Florida Bar,
1950-1952; President, Florida Probation and Parole Association, 1950-1951; Author of
1950 Juvenile Court Amendment to the Florida Constitution; Chairman of Drafting
Committee for a Juvenile Court Act for Florida, 1950-1951.
1. Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26880; to be incorporated into FLA. STAT. (1951) as c. 39,
when the new compilation is published. References in this article to sections of the new
juvenile court law are to sections as they will be numbered in FLA. STAT. (1951).
2. For an exposition of the historical and legal basis of juvenile courts, the concepts
underlying the law, and a comparison of the new law with the juvenile court laws of other
states, see Waybright, A Proposed juvenile Court Act for Florida, 4 U. OF FLA. L. REV. 16
(1951).
I FLA. STAT. § 39.01(l) (1951).
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county or for a district of several adjoining counties, can be very short. All
that is necessary in such an act is a section establishing the court in a certain
named county or in a district of certain named counties, in the case of a
district court specifying in which county it will be principally held. with
possibly a second section setting the salary of the judge and counselor, al-
though, as will be mentioned later in this article, setting those salaries in a
special act may be unconstitutional. Nothing else would be needed in such a
special act, and almost anything else which one might put in would be un-
constitutional as well as superfluous, as will be discussed further on in this
article.
The main criterion for the establishment of any new separate juvenile
court should be: Is the volume of work which is or should be handled by
the juvenile court in the county too large to be effectively handled by the
county judge in addition to his other work?
If consideration is given to the establishment of a district juvenile court,
careful thought should be given to such problems as whether the children
will be brought from all over the district to the judge, or whether the judge
will visit each county on a specified day each week or as necessary. The pro-
blems of extra travel expense, quick action in all counties, and how thin a
judge and his staff can be spread should be well mulled over, not for the
purpose of writing inelastic clauses into an act, but for the purpose of deter-
mining whether a district court will operate effectively.
JURISDICTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT
As authorized by the juvenile court amendment to the Florida Con-
stitution, 4 the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction of dependent
and delinquent children under the age of 17 years, married or unmarried,
who are domiciled, living or found within the county in which the court is
established."
A "dependent" child is really a neglected child. All children are de-
pendent to some degree, but to come under the legal definition8 of a de-
pendent child, the child must be destitute, homeless, abandoned or de-
pendent upon the public for support, or lack proper parental care or guard-
ianship, or be neglected as to support, education, or medical or other care,
or be in a condition or environment which injures or endangers his or others'
welfare, or have a home which is unfit by reason of neglect or of cruelty or
depravity of the parents.
4. FLA. CON T. Art. V, § 48, adopted Nov. 7, 1950. This is one of three new sec.
tions, each numbered 48, which were added to the judiciary article at the general elections
in 1948 and 1950. The writer pleads guilty to misnumbering the one relating to juvenile
courts, saying in mitigation only that the juvenile court amendment was originally drafted
in January of 1947, before the other two sections had been proposed.
5. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01(6), 39.02(1) (1951). One of the few changes made by the
1951 legislature in the bill presented to it by the state-wide drafting committee was to
lower the maximum age limit of children who come before juvenile courts from the 18th
to the 17th birthday.
6. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(10) (1951).
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A "delinquent" child 7 is one who violates a law or municipal ordinance,
is incorrigible, is persistently truant from school, is beyond his parents' con-
trol, associates with criminals or reputed criminals or vicious or immoral
persons, is growing up in idleness or crime, is found in a place predominantly
used for selling intoxicating drinks for consumption on the premises, or
whose occupation, behavior, or associations are such as to injure or endanger
his or others' welfare.
The juvenile court has the discretionary power to transfer to a criminal
court a child over 13 years old who is charged with the commission of what
would be a felony if committed by an adult. A child over 15 years old who
commits a capital offense must be transferred, as must a child charged with
law violation who requests transfer.8
A child charged with violation of federal law also comes under the
juvenile court's jurisdiction, if federal authorities waive federal jurisdiction.9
If considered necessary, the juvenile court can retain jurisdiction until
the child becomes 21.10
The judge also has the jurisdiction of a committing magistrate.1'
DOES ANY JUVENnE COURT HAVE ANY "ADDITIONAL" JURISDICTION?
The law contains a provision that it shall not "be deemed to take away
from the separate juvenile courts heretofore established in the counties of
Broward, Dade, Pinellas, and Polk any additional juvenile court or domestic
relations jurisdiction which may be conferred upon them by" certain special
acts. 12
These special acts apparently purport to confer on the juvenile courts
of these four counties the power to order parents to support their children,
and a few other rather vague odds and ends of jurisdiction. The special act
applying to the Dade County court goes further than the others, and pur-
ports also to confer jurisdiction over a wide range of matters, including
school attendance, child labor, cruelty to children, offenses against the per-
son and against decency and morality, bastardy, various physical and mental
disabilities, adoption, and annulment, as well as whatever else relating to
children might be within the jurisdiction of any other court temporal or
spiritual.
No extensive analysis of the Dade County act was made for the purpose
7. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(11) (1951).
8. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(6) (1951).
9. FLA. STAT, § 39.02(3) (1951).
10. FLA. STAT, § 39.02(5) (1951).
11. FLA. STAT. § 39.02 (4) 1951).
12. FLA. STAT. § 39.02 (7) 1951). The special acts are: For Broward County:
Fla. Laws 1945, c. 22709 (jurisdiction unaffected by Fla. Laws 1947, c. 24223, and Fla.
Laws 1949, c. 25428); For Dade County: Fla. Laws 1939, c. 19597 (Fla. Laws 1941, c.
21094, merely changes population figure in § 3 from 180,000 to 267,000) and Fla.
Laws 1951, c. 27000 (effective October 1, 1951, the day after the effective date of Fla.
Laws 1951, c. 26880); For Pinellas County: Fla. Laws 1927, c. 11972, as amended by
la. Laws 1943, c. 21849 (jurisdiction unaffected by Fla. Laws 1929, c. 13679, and Fla.
Laws 1933, c. 16060); For Polk County: Fla. Laws 1951, c. 27318.
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of pointing out the numerous instances in which other state and federal
constitutional provisions arc blithely ignored,a but it seemed rather obvious
that whatever additional jurisdiction was purportedly conferred on these
courts by these special acts is unconstitutional, for the practice of courts of
justice cannot be regulated by special or local laws in Florida. 4 In the
only case which has ever been taken to the Supreme Court of Florida con-
struing any of these special acts,' it was held that the provision of the Dade
County act purporting to give jurisdiction over bastardy proceedings was
unconstitutional, and there is no apparent reason why this ruling would be
inapplicable to the balance of the so-called additional jurisdictional features
of that special act and the others preserved from repeal by the new general
law.
Also, the repeal section of the new general law specifically preserves
from repeal any special act clauses which provide for referees or disposition
of articles of evidence (as in Dade County), or collection of costs from
parents. Undoubtedly these would conic under the same ruling of uncon-
stitutionality.
For all practical purposes, therefore, proceedings under any law other
than the new general law, in any juvenile court, would be of doubtful
legality, subject to attack by way of prohibition, habeas corpus, or appeal.
Many of the matters purportedly placed under the jurisdiction of a
particular juvenile court by these special acts should be handled by juvenile
courts, as will be contended later on in this article, but the grant of power
must be by general rather than special act.
How A CHILD Is TAKEN INTO CUSTODY
A child of juvenile court age cannot be taken into custody without an
order of the juvenile court judge, unless the child's condition or surroundings
are such that his own welfare requires it, or he is alleged to have violated a
law or ordinance. In either of those two instances any law enforcement
officer can take the child into custody, as can a juvenile court counselor or
assistant counselor.1
The person taking the child into custody must take him immediately
to the juvenile court, or to some place of detention specified by thc juvenile
court judge. The child cannot be taken to a police station or jail, or trans-
ported with adult prisoners, or finger-printed or photographed without an
13. Such as the provision in the Dade County special act empowering the court to
conduct criminal trials in cases of adults who waive jury trials, without the necessity of
filing those quaint indictments or infornations; and the general lack of due process
throughout.
14. FLA. Corqsr. Art. 3, §§ 20, 21.
15. State ex. rel. York v. Beckham, 160 Fla. 811, 36 So.2d 769 (1948). See, also,
Skinner v. City of Eustis, 147 Fla. 22, 2 So.2d 116, 135 A.L.R. 359 (1941); Mack v.
Carter, 133 Fla. 313, 183 So. 478 (1938). Cf. State ex rel Murphy-McDonald Builders'
Supply Co. v. Parks, 43 So.2d 347 (Fla. 1949); State ex rel Richardson v. Ferrell, 130
fla. 26, 177 So. 181 (1937).
16. FLA. STAT. § 39.03(1) (1951).
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order from the judge, and no police record can be made in which lie is identi-
fied other than by his initials and juvenile court case number.
17
This procedure should go far toward preventing circumvention of tested
juvenile court methods by rookie policemen who have become experts on
juvenile delinquency by donning a uniform, while at the same time leaving
law enforcement officers unhampered in their duty of apprehendiug vio-
lators of the law of all ages.
The judge cannot order a child taken to jail if there is a detention home
for children or a licensed child caring institution in the county, unless those
places cannot receive the child or the judge thinks they are not proper places
for him.' There are children of 16, and sometimes younger, who are more
than a match physically for the kindly people in charge of children's in-
stitutions, and who go berserk from rage or frustration, so that the secure
detention of a jail must be used for them. And in some of the smaller
counties jail is as yet the only place of detention for anyone, whether adult,
child, insane person or otherwise.
If a child is jailed he must be segregated from adult inmates, of course,'9
and the judge must advise thd county commissioners and the county child-
ren's committee of the reasons for the jailing?0  EventuAlly these public
bodies in the smaller counties may be stirred by repeated incidents to see
that children's detention quarters are provided elsewhere than in jail.
The child cannot be held in custody longer than two days without a
special order of the judge, unless he has already been adjudged to be a de-
linquent or a dependent child," which provides a safeguard against "for-
getting" a child in custody.
As a matter of practice, of course, most children are released to their
parents instead of taken into custody, and the parents bring them to the
juvenile court when notified. The law recognizes this practice, and pro-
vides for prompt notification to the parents if the child is kept in custody
instead of being released to them. "3
I NVESTIGATION
Most juvenile court cases begin with some sort of oral complaint being
made to the counselor, who investigates and files a petition if that course
seems indicated by the facts.24 In the past, with counselors appointed by
the Governor, much and often most of the activity of sonie juvenile courts
was carried on in the guise of "unofficial" cases, with the counselor doing
as he pleased unless a court order was required, in which case lie graciously
let the judge share in the case long enough to sign the order.
17. FLA. STAT. § 39.03(3), (6) (1951).
18. FLA. STAT. § 39.03(4) (1951).
19. FLA, STAT. § 39.03(5) (1951).
20. FLA. STAT. § 39.03(4) (1951).
21. FLA. STAT. § 39.03(7) (1951).
22. FLA. STAT. § 39.03(2) (1951).
23. FLA. STAT. § 39.03(3) (1951).
24. FA. STAT. § 39.04 (1951).
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Any virtue of such procedure lay in the fact that the child would have
no "record." The vice inherent in such free-wheeling is obvious, and what-
ever reason may once have existed for that practice has now disappeared,
for under the new law juvenile court records are not open to public in-
spection.25
It is expected, therefore, that from now on, in any case which requires
action by any juvenile court personnel, a petition will be filed as soon as the
counselor's investigation reveals the necessity for action, and that the judge,
who is responsible to the people, will supervise that action. As a matter of
fact, one of the main accomplishments of the new law is to make the judge
the captain of the juvenile court team, instead of an honorary co-captain.
PROCEDURE
The counselor, an assistant counselor, or any other person can file in
the juvenile court a written and verified petition stating the facts which are
alleged to constitute a child a delinquent or dependent child. 0
Often the parents bring the child to court at the time set for the hear-
ing, so that no process is necessary.2 7
Otherwise, a summons is served upon the parents and legal custodians,
and witness subpoenas upon witnesses. 2 If no parent or legal custodian
can be found, some relative of the child is summoned, and if no relative
can be found the judge can appoint a guardian ad litem for the child.29 The
judge can order the child taken into custody, by endorsement on the sum-
mons, under the same circumstances which have been referred to previously
as justifying the taking of a child into custody without court order.30 Fuve-
nile court process runs throughout the state.3'
The child or his parent or legal custodian can file an answer if desired,
but none is required, and anything which might be incorporated in a
written pleading may be pleaded orally before the court.8 2
After a petition is filed, the judge may order the child to be examined
physically or mentally. After a child is adjudicated to be a delinquent or
dependent child, and before adjudication with the parents' consent, the
judge may require the child to be treated. 33 Obviously, unless the county
commission has included funds for the purpose in the juvenile court budget,
or the parents are able and willing to pay the bill, such examination and
treatment will be on a charity basis.
The counselor investigates all cases where petitions are filed, so that
witnesses may be subpoenaed, for facts must be proved in juvenile court
25. FLA. STAT. § 39.12 (1951).
26. FLA. STAT. § 39.05 (1951).
27. FuA. STAT. § 39.06(1) (1951).
28. FLA, S'rAT. § 39.06(2), (4) (1951).
29. FLA. STAT. § 39.06(2), (5) (1951).
30. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.06(3), 39.03(1) (1951).
31. FLA. STAT. § 39.06(7) (1951).
32. FLA. ST^T. § 39.07 (1951).
33. FLA. STAT. § 39.08 (1951).
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cases just as in any other case, under the rules of evidence in use in equity
cases. Hearings are conducted in an informal manner, by the judge without
a jury. The general public is excluded, but in addition to the child and his
parents and their attorneys, anyone else they request or the judge directs
may be present.
34
If the facts proved in court are sufficient, the judge enters an order ad-
judicating the child to be a delinquent or dependent child. An adjudication
that a child is a delinquent child is, of course, not a conviction of crime, and
imposes no civil disabilities.35
WHAT THE COURT Dozs Wrrn DELINQUENT AND DEPENDENT CHILDREN
Once an adjudication has been made that a child is a delinquent or
dependent child, the court may make any of sevcral dispositions of the
child, and may change these dispositions from time to time, retaining juris-
diction until the child becomes twenty-one, if necessary, or ending juris-
diction at any time.
36
The child may be placed, under the continuous, skilled supervision of the
counselor, in his own home or the home of a willing relative, or in some
other suitable place, under such reasonable conditions as the judge may
direct. This is what is done in most cases, for the conditions the judge may
impose are virtually unlimited except by the standard of reasonableness, and
permit the use of all of the many techniques which experience has shown are
most effective in remolding children. If the home conditions of the child
are so wholly unsuitable as to be a detriment instead of a help, the child
may be committed for a time to a local detention home for children, sup-
ported by public tax funds, or to a private licensed child caring institution
willing to receive him. And, if really intensive rc-molding, away from all past
connections, is required, the child may be sent to one of the state industrial
schools, from which he is released when the officials in charge of the school
deem that he is ready to return home, but in no event later than his twenty-
first birthday. If there is no possibility that the child's home can ever be
made a fit place for him, he can be permanently committed to a licensed
child placing agency for adoption into a better home.3 7
This sketchy outline will not convey to those of limited expericncc with
juvenile court methods an adequate conception of the techniques of treat-
ment used. If the writer were competent to discourse upon them, a set
of books would be required in order properly to do so. Those who have
closely observed the operation of juvenile courts during the past half century
generally concede or assert that the methods used result in redeeming 85%
of juvenile delinquents for useful lives of good citizenship, while two-thirds
of the prison population is composed of habitual criminals. Juvenile court
34. FL. STAT. § 39.09 (1951).
35. FL. STAT. § 39.10 (1951).
36. FiA. STAT. §§ 39.02(5), 59.11(6) (1951).
37. FLA. STAT. § 39.11 (1951).
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personnel have their limitations, including an occupational allergy to con-
stitutional inhibitions which exasperates the orthodox priesthood of the law,
but in their actual operations they accomplish results which seem almost
miraculous to those familiar only with the retributive theory of the criminal
law.
RECORDS
Juvenile court records are not public records, and are not open to
public inspection. The social records of investigation and treatment and
other confidential information are closed to all but juvenile court personnel,
just as a psychiatrist's records are closed even to his patient. The official
records, consisting of all petitions, orders, pleadings, etc., arc open only to
the child and his parents and their attorneys. These records must be kept
for ten years, and may then be destroyed.:"
APPEALS
A very simple, inexpensive, speedy method of appeal to the circuit court
is provided by the new law to counter-balance any possibility of arbitrary
action in the course of the rather suminary juvenile court procedure.
A child, parent, or legal custodian affected by any juvenile court order
can file a written notice of appeal in the juvenile court within ten days.
Within ten days thereafter, the original juvenile court file is scnt over to the
circuit court. The state attorney represents the juvenile court. No briefs
need be filed unless the circuit court so directs, but they may be filed if
desired. On application, the circuit court sets the case down for argument
within fifteen days, and renders a decision within thirty days after the argu-
ment if possible. Appeal does not operate as a supersecleas, except that a
permanent order of commitment of a child to a licensed child placing agency
for subsequent adoption is suspended while the appeal is pending. The cir-
cuit court decides only whether the juvenile court entered a lawful order,
and does not substitute its judgment for that of the juvenile court in dis-
cretionary matters. Writ of certiorari from the supreme to the circuit court
may be sought.3"
JUDGE'S QUALIFIGA'TIONS AND LI;cirON
The county judge is the juvenile court judge in fifty-nine of Florida's
sixty-seven counties, and his qualifications are prescribed in the Constitution,
not by the new general law.
In the eight counties where separate juvenile courts are established,
the judge must be a qualified voter in the county, at least twenty-five years
old, and either have served as judge of a separate juvenile court in Florida
or be a lawyer. I-Ie is elected by the people for a four year term. The Cover-
38. FIA. STAT. § 39.12 (1951). The legislature struck out the section which would
have prohibited publication of a child's name, picture, or address in connection with
juvenile court cases, but as a matter of practice newspapers rarely publish such infornation.
39. FLA. STAT. § 39.14 (1951).
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nor fills any vacancy by appointment until the next general election. If
the judge is absent from the county or temporarily unable to act, the county
judge or a circuit judge fills in.
40
It is to be hoped that many of the younger lawyers, and students in
law schools, will fit themselves for positions as judges of juvenile courts by
study and experience in the "socio" aspects of these socio-legal courts. There
is no question that the judge should be trained in the law, and there is also
no question that a person who is trained only in the law will be as ineffective
a judge as one who has other qualifications without legal training will be
dangerous. A very satisfying career of useful service is open to lawyers who
are genuinely interested in and qualified for work with children.
QUALIFICATIONS AND SELECTION OF COUNSELORS
No juvenile court, even in the smallest county, can be very effective
without a counselor to do the investigating and supervising of children. It
is facetious to speak of having a juvenile court, if it consists only of a
county judge to whom a child is brought by a law enforcement officer, and
who is limited to looking into his crystal ball to try to find out what caused
the child's trouble, then giving out with a few well-chosen cliches about how
he must be a good boy and hoping that will do the trick. A skilled counselor,
even on a part-time basis, can go out and find what is the basic cause of the
child's misbehavior or neglect, make dependable recommendations to the
judge, and see that the judge's orders are carried out, Law enforcement
officers are trained to find out who violated a law, not why that person
committed the violation. For this reason, it was particularly unfortunate
that the legislature saw fit to change the financing plan of the new juvenile
court law from a mandatory requirement that counties finance these courts
adequately to a permissive plan. Under the law as enacted, it is imperative
that the lawyers and other enlightened citizens of each community bring
home to the county commissioners in each county the truism that no one
can work effectively without the proper tools, and that no juvenile court
judge can do what is expected of him unless funds arc provided for the
employment of an adequate staff of counselors.
In most of Florida's counties, only one counselor will be available, and
in many of them that one will be on only a part-time basis. In the larger
counties, staffs of fifteen or twenty or more will be required in order to
handle the thousands of cases which conic before the courts each year, and
the counselor determines the number of assistants required, with the ap-
proval of the judge, within the limitations imposed by funds available.4'
In the eight counties where separate juvenile courts are established,
each counselor and assistant counselor must either have served as counselor
or assistant counselor of a juvenile court in Florida, or have a college degree,
40. FLA. STAT. § 39.15 (1951).
41. FLA. STAT. § 39.16(9) (1951).
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or have four years of experience in some sort of work with children. In the
other 59 counties, qualifications must be as nearly as possible equivalent4
2
A list of not less than three qualified applicants is made up for each
vacant position by a juvenile court merit board, and from this list the judge
selects the counselor, and the counselor selects the assistants with the ap-
proval of the judge.43 In the very largest counties, where a secretary or some
such employee works primarily for the judge rather than tinder the coun-
selor's supervision, the judge alone selects that employee, but otherwise the
counselor, with the approval of the judge, selects employees other than
assistant counselors.4
4
The juvenile court merit board is unpaid, but its expenses are paid.
45
The board consists of a county commissioner, the county school superin-
tendent or a member of the school board, a member of the district welfare
board, the director of the county health unit where one exists, and those
citizens who are appointed as members of the county board of visitors to
oversee county detention homes for children.46
The merit board requires written applications from applicants for
positions, and may require written examinations and oral interviews.47 The
board, with the approval of the judge, adopts civil service rules requiring
discharge only for cause of juvenile court personnel other than the judge.4 8
In Duval County, and in any other county where a county civil service
law for county employees may subsequently be put into effect, the counselor,
assistants, and employees come under that law, and the juvenile court merit
board does not function.4
The present counselors, and some of the present assistants, are serving
definite terms by gubernatorial appointment. At the end of those terms,
the places they hold will be filled in accordance with the new law.50
FINANCING
Each fiscal year, the county commission can set aside in the county
budget, as a fund for the expense of the operation of the juvenile court, a
sum not to exceed twenty-five cents for each inhabitant of the county.5'
Out of this fund, the salaries of the judge and counselor are paid, the
county commission being authorized to set these salaries at not exceeding
certain figures based on the county's population, but not less than may be
provided by any special act.5 2 The salaries of other juvenile court personnel
42. FLA. STAT. § 39.16:1' 1951).
43. FLA. STAT. § 39.16 2 1951).
44. FLA. STAT. § 39.16(5 1951).
45. FLA, STAT. § 39.16(3) 1951).
46. FLA. STAT. § 39.01 15), (16) (1951).
47. FLA. STAT. § 39.163) (1951).
48. FLA. STAT. § 39.16(4) (1951).
49. FLA. STAT. § 39.16(6 1951).
50. FLA. STAT. § 39.16(8 1951).
51. FtA. STAT. § 39.18(1) (1951).
52. FLA. STAT. § 39.18(2), (10) (1951). Inasmuch as FLA. CONST. Art. 3, §§ 20,
21, prohibit the passage of special or local laws "regulating the fees of officers of the
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as set by the counselor with the approval of the judge within the limits of
the budget, and travel and office expense, are also paid out of this juvenile
court fund."3 Payment is made out of other county funds for office rent if
quarters outside county buildings are necessary, sheriff's fees for service of
process not served by juvenile court personnel, operation of parental homes
or detention quarters, and expense of transporting children to the industrial
schools at Ocala and Marianna."4
No fees are ever charged by the juvenile court, and juvenile court per.
sonnel are not paid on a fee basis. A person appealing to the circuit court
pays the fee of the circuit court clerk for filing the appeal, but that is the
only time any fee payment enters the picture, except that witnesses who
are not parents or legal custodians of the child are paid witness fees.""
PHILOSOPHY UNDERLYING THE NEW LAw
The new juvenile court law is a demonstration that our judicial process
can be adapted to changing conditions and new concepts while retaining
the safeguards proved essential to justice by millenia of experience.
The standard judicial process is simplified and made to operate infor.
mally, so as to be effective in dealing with immature children, and greater
use is made of such developments in human knowledge as modern psycho-
logy and sociology. But the process used is judicial, not administrative, and
the fundamental right of personal, individual liberty is as carefully preserved
as in orthodox procedure.
The emphasis, in cases of delinquent children, is more on ascertaining
the cause of the misbehavior, determination that the child did misbehave
being only the first step. The concept of reformation is substituted for that
of retribution, punishment as a deterrent to crime being recognized as too
ineffective and treatment to fit the individual being substituted for punish-
ment to fit the crime.
LOOKING TOWARD THE FuTURE
After forty years of experience with juvenile courts in Florida, and
fifty-two years of observing their operation in some other states, we bought
no pig in a poke when we put the new law into effect.
Juvenile courts in Florida have handled some cases of delinquent child-
ren since they were first established. They will now handle most of these
cases, for now their jurisdiction over child law violators is exclusive, with
State and county," the queston arises whether these special acts fixing salaries are constitu-
tional, in view of several cases holding special salary acts invalid where the officer concerned
was to be paid a straight salary instead of fees. State ex rel Juvenal v. Neville, 123 Fla.
745, 167 So. 650 (1936) (county commissioner); Barrow v. Smith, 119 Fla. 468, 158 So.
818 (1935) (school hoard); State ex rel Cohen v. O'Neal, 99 Fla. 1053, 128 So. 489
(1930 ),rehearing denied 100 Fla. 1277, 131 So. 165 (1930) (clerk of criminal court of
record).
53. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.16(9), 39.18(3) (1951).
54. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.06(9), 39.18(8) (1951).55. FLA. STAT. §§ 39,14(2), 39.18(4), 39.19 (1951).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
some qualifications. But the manner of handling them is already well worked
out, and will cause no undue stress and strain.
Because the procedure is now standardized and spelled out clearly in the
new law, the operation of these courts should be even more efficient from
now on.
With the assurance that the minimum qualifications for judges and
counselors, prescribed by the new law, will cause the present high caliber of
juvenile court personnel to be maintained or even exceeded in the future, we
can, with confidence, urge that certain additional features be added to this
basic juvenile court law by future legislatures.
COMPELLING PARENTAL SUPPORT OF CHILDIEN
Almost four thousand years ago, in the prologue to the oldest law code
yet discovered, King Lipit-lshtar bragged that he had established justice in
Sumer and Akkad, and had re-established equitable family practices for the
welfare of his subjects. "I made the father support his children and I made
the children support their father; I made the father stand by his children
and I made the children stand by their father," he crowed.56
Possibly the most pronounced lack in the new juvenile court law is that
it makes no change in our obsolete methods of compelling parents to support
their own children.
The prevailing view now in all the states is that parents are, regardless
of any statute, under a legal as well as a moral duty to support, maintain and
care for their minor children. This obligation is sometimes spoken of as
one under the common law and sometimes as a matter of natural right and
justice, and is often accepted as a matter of course without the assignment
of any reason. It may be, of course, and now frequently is, a duty specifically
imposed by statute.7
But, while the legal duty of a parent to support his child in accordance
with the child's needs and the parent's ability is recognized, the practical
difficulty is in the method of enforcing this duty, which is usually limited
to criminal proceedings for contributing to the dependency of a child, suits
against the parent by a third person who furnished necessaries to the child,
or, in some states, direct proceedings in equity under specific statutes against
the parent by the child, or someone in the child's behalf, to compel sup-
port.58
" In Florida, the criminal proceeding against the parent is available,59 and
is the method exclusively used by juvenile court judges, in their capacities
as committing magistrates, if we ignore the special acts applying to the
56. PRITCHARD, ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN TEXTS RELATING TO THE OLD TESTAMFNT
159 (1950); Speiser, Ancient Mesopotamia: A Light That Did Not Fail, 99 mTE NATIONAL
GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZINE 1, p. 41, 78 (Jan. 1951).
57. 39 AM. liR., Parent and Child § 35 (1942).
58. 39 Am. Jux., Parent and Child § 45 (1942).
59. FLA. STAT. §§ 828.19, 828.21 (1951), formerly FLA. STAT. §§ 415.02, 415.31
(1949).
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counties of Broward, Dade, Pinellas, and Polk, which purport to give to the
juvenile courts of those counties a more effective civil procedure.
Also available in Florida is the suit by a third person furnishing neces-
saries to the child, but there is no general statute allowing a direct proceed-
ing in equity by the child against his parent, and there has been no evidence
that the circuit courts conceive that they have jurisdiction to compel sup-
port of a child except as an incident to a suit for divorce or separate main-
tenance filed by the mother against the father.
The National Probation and Parole Association strongly recommends
that juvenile courts be given jurisdiction to try adults on criminal charges,60
and 31 of the 48 states had such laws by 1939,1 but it is conceived that
such criminal trials can be much better handled in the regular criminal
courts, where juries are customarily empaneled and judges are experienced
in presiding over criminal trials, and that holding criminal trials in a juvenile
court would have an unfortunate tendency to permeate the juvenile court
with the much-different atmosphere of the criminal court.
Criminal proceedings are of very little effectiveness, anyway. A man in
jail is not supporting his child.
What is needed is a statutory procedure which can be initiated by a
person other than the mother if she declines to act, which will reach any
property or Wages of either the father or mother, and subject them to con-
tempt proceedings for failure to obey court orders to support their children,
just as is done with the father in separate maintenance and divorce cases.
Such additional jurisdiction could easily be conferred upon juvenile
courts by simply adding to the jurisdiction section of the new law another
subsection, giving these courts the power to require each parent of an un-
married dependent child to furnish to the child adequate and proper care,
support, maintenance, and education, or to pay such sums of money for
those purposes as may be in keeping with the needs of the child and the
abilities of the parent, and in the exercise of that jurisdiction to enforce
its orders by contempt proceedings, entry of judgment for unpaid monies
and issuance of execution thereon, writs of garnishment, sequestration, and
ne exeat, and such other methods as may be available to circuit courts to
enforce similar orders against the father entered incident to decrees of
separate maintenance or divorce.
There would still be parents who skip the state, or who fail to work,
and who for one reason or another would escape the obligation of support-
ing their children, but the juvenile court procedure to compel support for
60. A STNDaRv JUVENILE COURT Ar 29 et seq. (Rev. ed. (1949).
61. COSULICH, JUVENILE COURT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 69-72: Alabama,
California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin. Also District
of Columbia, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico.
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children would at least be as effective as now obtains in the circuit court
when separate maintenance or divorce suits are brought.
COMPELLING SUPPORT OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
Each individual's attitude toward illegitimacy as a moral and social
problem will probably range somewhere between the approach of the Jewish
law of the seventh century B.C., which said:0 2
A bastard shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord;
even to his tenth generation shall he not enter into the con-
gregation of the Lord.
and the sentiment of the more modern, nauseating little couplet:0 3
Should a father's carnal sins
Blight the life of babykins?
When the matter of illegitimacy is approached as a legal and economic
problem, however, probably all of us will agree that, whether we would be
willing to support our own woods colts or not, we certainly do not wish to
support the bastards of anyone else if we can make him do it.64
At common law, the father of an illegitimate child was under no obli-
gation to contribute to the child's support. 5 In 1575-1576 England enacted
a bastardy law06 placing responsibility on both parents. In this country,
bastardy laws were early enacted in most of the states, as early as 1673 in
Connecticut.
7
Florida's original bastardy proceeding68 was enacted into law by the
Territorial Governor and Territorial Council in 1828, just seven years after
Florida was ceded by Spain to the United States, and 17 years before the
Territory became a state. It provided for a quasi-criminal, quasi-civil pro-
ceeding " by which a single woman who was pregnant or delivered of an
illegitimate child could make complaint to the county judge or justice of the
62. Deuteronomy 23:2, KINe JAMES VERSION OF TIE BIBLE (1611). Although
Deuteronomy is called the Fifth Book of Moses, and gaily back-dated to 1451 B. C. to
conform to this courteous ascription of authorship, it contains an account of the death
of Moses, and was actually a re-codification of Jewish law probably secretly prepared 693-
639 B. C.: BATES, 'iHE BIBLE DESICNED TO BE REAO AS LIVING LITERATURE 147 (1936).
63. Lardner and Kaufman, June Moon, in MANTLE, TE BEST P3LAYS OF 1929-30
262 (1930).
64. We might be tempted to emulate Grover Cleveland, who is reported to have
said to a heckler at a political meeting, "I have cared for and educated my bastards. What
have you done for yours?" DEFORD, LOVE-CHILDREN 19 (1931). Somewhere in between
the two views will be found the 1658 law of Plymouth Colony, immortalized in Nathaniel
Hawthorne's book, THE SCARLET LETTER, which required the lifelong wearing by the
mother of an illegitimate child of the letter "A" for "adulteress." Morlock and Camp-
bell, Maternity Homes For Unmarrried Mothers 2 (1946), U. S. CHILDREN'S BUREAU
PUBLICATION 309.
65. 7 AM. JuR., Bastards §§ 69, 79 (1937).
66. 18 Eliz., c. 3 (1575-1576) Cf. I BL. OMM. § 458.
67 U. S. CHILDREN'S BUREAU CHART No. 16, PATERNITY LAWS 5 (1938).
68. Act of January 5, 1828, carried forward with only slight change as FLA. STAT. C.
742 (1949).
69. The supreme court called it a civil action, and said "The statute was not de-
signed to punish the accused, but to make him contribute to the support of the child ...
a civil procedure to enforce a police regulation designed to secure immunity of the public
from the child's support." Flores v. State, 72 Fla. 302, 310, 73 So. 234, 236 (1916).
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peace; if, upon a jury trial in the circuit court, the reputed father was deter-
mined to be the real father, the circuit court could order the father to pay
to the mother all necessary incidental expenses attending the birth, and
$50.00 yearly for ten years toward the support, maintenance and education
of the child; if the father failed to pay as ordered, he could be imprisoned
for a term up to a year.
This original Florida bastardy proceeding remained virtually unchanged
for 123 years, until June 9, 1951. It had long been obvious that, whatever
might have been the situation in 1828, a child could no longer be supported
for slightly less than a dollar a week, nor did a child become self-supporting
at the age of ten. As early as 1938,7" only five states had no bastardy law
compelling the father to support his illegitimate child, while eight states set
the amounts he was to pay at greater than the Florida figure, and thirty-
four states set no limit but left the amount to be fixed by the court from
time to time. Apart from this rather invidious comparison, the people of
Florida were taxing themselves to pay as much as $27.00 per month for the
support of an illegitimate child under the federal-state program of Aid to
Dependent Children, and were continuing to pay until the child became
eighteen.
This situation was greatly improved by the 1951 legislature, which
passed a statute7 l prescribing a completely new bastardy proceeding.
The new law gives the right to any unmarried woman who shall be
pregnant or delivered of a bastard child to bring proceedings in the circuit
court, in chancery, to determine the paternity of the child. Complaint and
answer in usual form are followed by a private hearing in chambers. Ap-
parently special masters are not to be used. Either party may demand that
the issue of paternity be tried by a jury, but otherwise the court determines
the issue of paternity, and in any event the court determines the ability of each
parent to support the child. If the defendant is adjudicated to be the father,
the court may order him to pay reasonable attorneys' fees, hospital or
medical expenses, cost of confinement and any other expenses incident to
the birth, and periodic payments of support money for the child. The jury
has no hand in fixing these amounts. The statute provides that the court
"shall" order the defendant to pay monthly, for the care and support of the
child, between $40.00 and $110.00, depending on the age of the child, but
goes on to give the court power to increase or decrease these amounts, so
that they seem to be only suggestive. While the suggested scale of payments
terminates at the eighteenth birthday, there is nothing else in the statute
which would prevent payments being ordered for older youths. There is no
statutory requirement that the child be unmarried when the adjudication
is made, nor that payments cease upon marriage of the child. The court
may change the amounts from time to time, retaining jurisdiction to do so.
70. U. S. CHILDREN'S BUREAU CHART No. 16, PATERNITY LAWS (1938).
71. FLA. LAws 1951, c. 26949, effective June 9, 1951.
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Upon default in payments ordered, judgment can be entered, which is a
lien on the defendant's real and personal property, placing of an execution
in the sheriff's bands not being required in order to make the judgment a
lien on the defendant's personal property. Contempt proceedings may also
be resorted to in case of default in payments. The defendant may also be
required to post a performance bond. No imprisonment is contemplated,
except as for contempt.
No bar is expressed in the statute against proceedings being brought
now on behalf of any illegitimate child born within the past eighteen years.
There is no saving clause as to pending cases in the section which repeals
the old law.
One section of the new statute makes it a misdemeanor, punishable by
as much as a year's imprisonment and a $1000.00 fine, to publish or broad-
cast the name of any party to a bastardy proceeding. It is interesting to note
that a somewhat similar provision, but with violation punishable only as
for contempt, was deleted by the same legislature from the new juvenile
court act, at the behest of newspaper publishers who were apparently un-
aware of the new bastardy act.
This new bastardy proceeding is a considerable step forward in the
handling of the legal and economic aspects of the problem of illegitimacy.
Basically, it employes principles which are sound and workable. There can
be no objection to it as being dangerous or unworkable, for such laws have
worked as well as can be expected in other states for many years, effecting
greater justice for the child and the tax-paying public while protecting the
putative father against false, easily-made and hard-to-refute charges as well
as can be hoped for under a system of justice which, while guarding indivi-
dual liberty better than any older system, and better than any other con-
temporary system, still results in only substantial justice rather than perfect
justice.
Such sketchy studies as have been made show that in most cases the
defendant in a bastardy proceeding is an unskilled laborer, often unemployed
or irregularly employed, with earnings so small as barely to provide a mini-
mum standard of living for himself, and with little resources and no bank
account. For the most part, lump-sum payments cannot be made, and the
periodic sums ordered are not sufficient to care for the child, even if pay-
ments were made as ordered. In prosperous years, 44% of the fathers were
in arrears within two years, 73% within seven years. In depression years,
80% of White fathers and 86% of Negro fathers were behind in their pay-
ments within two years, nearly half of them owing over 50% of the amounts
ordered paid. 2 As Miss Maud Morlock, Consultant of the U. S. Children's
Bureau, concludes after long study, "These figures clearly suggest that we
have had false hopes of the efficacy of court orders as a means of actually
72. Morlock, A Community's Responsibility for the Child Born Out of Wedlock 5
(1949), mimeographed by U. S. Children's Bureau; Morlock, The Fathers of Children
Born Out of Wedlock 1, 4.6 (1939), mimeographed by U. S. Children's Bureau.
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providing support for children born out of wedlock. Although support may
be obtained for the difficult early years, it is probable that only a small
proportion of the children born out of wedlock are supported until they are
16 years of age by the men adjudged to be their fathers."'P
It is entirely possible that this is one of the many areas of human con-
duct where the answer rests not so much in strict legal proceedings as in the
accompanying greater use of social casework. 4 There is encouraging evi-
dence that greater effectiveness is achieved by approaching the father as a
decent human being, privately and informally, and urging him to assume
the responsibility of supporting his child voluntarily, than in an adversary
approach based on the expectation that he will deny paternity, admit
nothing, agree to nothing, and evade all responsibility if possible. In some
urban communities, where voluntary acknowledgment of paternity before
a court is possible, 75% to 90% of the putative fathers follow this course.
15
In Sweden, where the attitude toward illegitimacy is considerably more
relaxed, paternity was established in 93% of the cases brought to court, and
of these, in about 90% paternity was established by admission, in only about
10% by adjudication. after contest.76
It seems evident, therefore, that bastardy proceedings, substantially
similar to the type contemplated by the new statute, should be handled by
the juvenile court rather than by the circuit court. The new bastardy law
imposes a form of juvenile court procedure on the circuit court, by providing
for private hearings in chambers, absence of publicity, and equity procedure.
But, as with other circuit court cases, the court file is a public record, open
to the perusal of the scandal-monger, certainly available to be printed and
broadcast in full outside Florida, and to be printed and broadcast within
Florida with appropriate hints as to the identity of prominent unnamed
parties. Nor does the circuit court have any personnel to investigate, help
establish the facts and attempt to work out mutually satisfactory arrange-
ments with the putative father. The mother, who is under twenty years old
in over half of 80,000 births registered as illegitimate in the United States
each year, 7 has no one to help her in the circuit court, unless she can induce
73. Morlock, The Fathers of Children Born Out of Wedlock 5 (1939), mimeo-
graphed by U. S. Children's Bureau.
74. Morlock and Campbell, Maternity Homes for Unmarried Mothers 15-17 (1946),
U, S. CHILDREN'S BuRRAu PUBLICATION 309; Haynam, Casework Treatment of the Un-
married Mother 7-8 (1949), mimeographed by U. S. Children's Bureau, paper prepared
for Committee on Unmarried Parents, 1947 National Conference of Social Work.
75. Morlock, supra note 73, at 2.
76. THE ROYAL SOCIAL BOARD, SOCIAL WORK AND LECISLATION IN SWEDEN 235
(1938); Reider, The Unmarried Father 230, 18 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ORTHO-
PSYCHIATRY 2 (April 1948); Morlock, supra note 73, at 2,
77. Morlock and Campbell, supra note 74, at 13; Morlock, The Adolescent Unmar-
ried Mother, PRACTICAL HOME EcoNoMIcs (May 1946). The State Board of Health
advises: that 5134 illegitimate births to Florida residents were registered in 1950; the
number has more than doubled in the last decade, although percentage-wise the rate of
increase has been less than 6%; in 1949, the latest year for which the figures have been
analyzed, there were 4427 registered illegitimate births, of which 101 were to non-resi.
dents, 775 to white mothers, 3652 to Negro mothers, 1869 to mothers under 20 years old.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
some prosecuting attorney or other attorney to represent her, with his fee
remotely squeezable out of an unskilled laborer if he is successful. The
putative father, faced by a charge which can easily be made and is hard to
disprove-and which the mother is forced to make against some man in
order to qualify for Aid to Dependent Children-with little or no knowledge
of such things as blood grouping tests,?A and usually with only meager
earnings, can also resort only to the help of a reluctant attorney. The cir-
cuit judge, eager to discover the truth, but limited in his search to sifting
what is offered to him by the parties, is not in an enviable position.
The right to a jury trial, which was given by the 1828 law and hence
is required by the state constitutions later adopted to be preserved inviolate,
could be protected by provision for empaneling a jury in the juvenile court
on demand of either the mother or putative father, or, preferably, by trans-
fer of the case to the circuit court on demand of either for a jury trial.
Consideration should also be given to the advisability of incorporating
in the bastardy statute certain features of the laws of other states.78 Should
the Director of the Department of Public Welfare be authorized to begin
the proce6ding, where Aid to Dependent Children grants are involved, or
should only the mother have that right? Should a compromise settlement
between the mother and father, without court approval, be binding? Should
some corroboration of the mother's testimony as to paternity be required?
If a witness testifies that he had access to the mother about the time the
child was conceived, should corroboration be required before that testimony
is admissible? Should there be a requirement that the mother and child
submit to blood-grouping tests on demand of the putative father, and that
the result of such a test can be offered in evidence only by the putative
father, since such tests can sometimes disprove but can never prove pater-
nity?79
In connection with our consideration of the bastardy statute, it may
be well to take into account the effect, or absence of effect, of such a statute
upon other Florida laws relating to illegitimate children, to complete the
picture. Where a bastardy statute such as the one we have in Florida is in
force, that statute is the exclusive basis of the father's liability.80 The father
77A. See Cascuote, 6 Miami L. Q. 128.
78. See Schatkin, Paternity Proceedings in New York, NEw YoRKc LAW JOURNAL.
(Jan. 9-12, 1940), for a discussion of the statute applying to the City of New York.
79. A study of 319 blood tests done by order of the Court of Special Sessions in New
York City revealed that 29, or nearly 10%, resulted in exclusions of paternity, and in each
of those 29 cases the alleged father was adjudged not to be the father. Wisconsin, New
Jersey and Ohio have similar statutes, and European courts have used such tests since 1924.
Schatkin, supra note 78, at 9. See also ANDRESEN, TiE HUMAN BLOOD GROUPS UTIILIZED
IN DISPUTED PATERNITY CASES AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINCS (1950); Waybright and
Waybright, Grouping and Typing of Blood and Other Substances and Stains in Cases of
Disputed Parentage and in Rape Cases, 12 FLA. L. 1. 251 (July 1938).
80. People ex tel Lawton v. Snell, 216 N. Y. 527, 111 N. E. 50, Ann. Cas. 1917D
222 (1916). Sec Note, 30 A.L.R. 1069,
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is not punishable under the criminal statute8' for contributing to the de-
pendency of his illegitimate child.8 2 Nor is any duty imposed upon a
father to support his illegitimate child by the statute,83 which provides that
the child may inherit from him if he acknowledges the child in writing
signed in the presence of a competent witness. 84 A father may be required
to abide by a contract he makes to support his illegitimate child, and the
contract is not illegal nor against public policy.85
The new bastardy proceeding does not have the effect of legitimatizing
the child, and does not change the child's status in any way except, if his
mother so chooses, to give him a right to be supported by his father to a
greater extent than before. Neither would the proposed change of juris.
diction of bastardy proceedings to the juvenile court work any other change
in the child's status. The other Florida statutes relating to illegitimate
children 6 would be entirely unaffected. The object of the 1951 bastardy
law revision, and the object of the proposed transfer of jurisdiction to the
juvenile court, are to place the burden of supporting illegitimate children
where the burden belongs, so far as possible, not to alter a social system
which is deeply rooted in our cultural memory.87
81. FLA. STAT. §§ 828.19, 828.21 (1951), formerly FLA. STAT. §§ 415.02, 415.31
(1949).
82. Beaver v. State, 96 Tex. Crim. Rep. 179, 256 S. W. 99, 30 A.L.R. 1073 (1923).
83. FLA. STAT. § 731.29 (1949).
84. Brisbin v. Huntington, 128 Iowa 166, 103 N. W. 144, 148, 5 Ann. Cas. 931
(1905).
85. 7 AM. TUR., Bastards §§ 73-78 (1937).
86. FLA. STAT. § 65.05 (divorce does not render children born during marriage
illegitimate, except where granted on ground that either party had a living spouse at time
of marriage); FLA. STAT. §§ 382.18, 382.21, 382.35 (birth registration; contemplates
legitimatization by court order, but except in unique circumstances no Florida court has
that power, in spite of mention of "legitimizing children" in FLA. CONST. Art. III, §
20); FLA. STAT. § 440.02(13) (workmen's compensation benefits for "acknowledged
illegitimate child dependent upon the deceased"); FLA. STAT. § 731.29 (illegitimate child
is heir of mother, "and also of the person who, in writing, signed in the presence of a
competent witness, acknowledges himself to be the father"); FLA. STAT. § 741.11 (issue
of marriage between White and Negro is bastard); FLA. STAT. §741.20 (children born be-
fore 1866 of unsolemnized slave marriages legitimatized); FLA. STAT. § 744.13 (mother of
illegitimate child is his natural guardian); FLA. STAT. §§ 782.16, 78217 (unlawful for
mother to conceal death of issue which, if born alive, would be bastard) (1949).
87. The concept underlying FLA. STAT. § 731.29 (1949) is at least about .3678 years
old, for about 1727 B. C. the Code of Hammurabi was promulgated, providing in §§ 170
and 171 that "When a seignor's first wife bore him children and his female slave also
bore him children, if the father during his lifetime has ever said 'My children!' to the
children whom the slave bore him, thus having counted them with the children of the
first wife, after the father has gone to (his) fate, the children of the first wife and the
children of the slave shall share equally in the goods of the paternal estate, with the
first-born, the son of the first wife, receiving a preferential share. However, if the father
during his lifetime has never said 'My ehildrenl' to the children whom the slave bore him,
after the father has gone to (his) fate, the children of the slave may not share in the
goods of the paternal estate along with the children of the first wife." PRITCHARD,
ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN TEXTS RELATING TO TINE OLD TESTAMENT 173 (1950).
FLA. STAT. § 741,11 (1949) has as an antecedent the ancient Germanic law, which
recognized as legitimate only those whose parents were of the same social rank, and re.
garded all others as bastards. 3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITTANICA 191 (1947).
FLA. STAT. §§ 782.16, 782.17 (1949) is similar to the Scottish law mentioned in Sir
Walter Scott's novel, TIrE IEART OF MIDLOTHIAN, based on actual happenings in the
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ADOPTION OF CHILDREN
The right of adoption, while known to the ancients of Egypt, Baby-
Ionia, Assyria, Germany, Greece and Rome, and probably to other ancient
peoples, and while practiced among many of the continental nations under
the civil law from the remotest antiquity, was unknown to the common law
of England, and exists in this country, in those jurisdictions having that
common law as the basis of their jurisprudence, only by virtue of statute.88
Adoption proceedings are wholly statutory in Florida. 9
The most common method for effecting an adoption is by a judicial
proceeding. The action of the court is invoked by an application or petition,
and the adoption is effected by the decree of the court. While the power of
a court or judge under such a statute calls for the exercise of judgment, and
is in that sense judicial, and the judge, in the performance of his duties under
such a statute, exercises judicial functions, yet the proceeding is not a
judicial proceeding in the full sense of that term. The power of the court
or judge is no part of the judicial power mentioned in the constitution and
by it vested in the courts, as distinguished from an individual judge thereof.
It seems, however, that it is within the power of the legislature to make the
proceeding a judicial one, and that, in such case, the exercise of the power
by the court is an exercise of the judicial power vested in it by the organic
law. The power to decree an adoption being purely a creation of statute,
the statute is the measure of the court's authority.90
jurisdiction of adoption proceedings is generally conferred upon the
court having jurisdiction of probate matters, variously designated in the
different states as Probate, Surrogate, Orphans', and sometimes County
courts. In other states the right to conduct adoption proceedings is con-
ferred upon courts of general jurisdiction, 1
Since adoption is a creature of the legislature, it is within its province
to transfer such jurisdiction from one court to another 2
From 1885 until 1943 the Florida statute gave jurisdiction of adoption
proceedings to the circuit judges, not to the circuit courts. 3 In 1943 the
adoption statute was completely re-written to provide for social investiga-
tion and recommendation by either the State Welfare Board (called the
Department of Public Welfare now) or a licensed child placing agency,-and
Edinburgh of 1736; Effie Deans was sentenced to death for the supposed death of her
baby boy at birth, although he had actually been stolen and was found as a youth. Mor-
lock and Campbell, Maternity Homes for Unmarried Mothers 2 (1946), U. S. CmLD-
REN'S BUREAU PUBLICATION 309.
88. In re Palmers Adoption, 129 Fla. 630, 176 So. 537 (1937); 1 Am. TUR., Adop-
tion of Children § 3 (1936); 2 C. J. S., Adoption of Children § 2 (1936). Sections 185-
193 of the Code of Hammurabi, promulgated about 1727 B. C., regulate adoption: Parr:,
CHARD, ANCIENT NEAR EAS'rElN TEXTS RELATING TO THE OLD TESTAMENT 174-175
(1950).
89. Sheffield v. Barry, 153 Fla. 144, 14 So.2d 417 (1943).
90. 1 AM. jus., Adoption of Children § 30 (1936).
91. 1 AM. lUJ., Adoption of Children § 31 (1936).
92. 2 C. I. S., Adoption of Children § 35a (1936).
93. FLA. STAT. t. 72 (1941), and prior laws.
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in the process of this re-writing the circuit courts were given jurisdiction of
adoption of minors in place of the circuit judges? 4 In 1947 additional sec-
tions were added, providing for adoption of adults, with jurisdiction vested
in the circuit judges instead of the circuit courts?5
Adoption of children of juvenile court age is clearly a function much
better exercised by the juvenile courts than by the circuit courts. The pri-
mary consideration is the welfare of the child, a consideration which is the
keystone of juvenile court administration.
While a thorough social investigation is usually made by the better
licensed child placing agencies when they place children for adoption, that
is not often true in the far greater number of cases where children are placed
privately and the investigation is made by the Department of Public Wel-
fare. Chronic budgetary shortages have resulted in continuous failure of the
Department of Public Welfare to have an adequate staff. Often the staff
is not able to make even the customary two visits to the adoptive home with-
in the time allotted by the statute, so that the interlocutory or final hearing
must be postponed. While the licensed child placing agencies are pressing
for legislation to outlaw the independent placement of children for adop-
tion, which they choose to call a "gray market in babies", they admit that
the funds presently available to them would not permit them to do an
effective job if such legislation is enacted.
Placing adoption jurisdiction in juvenile courts would assure that, no
matter what the staff situation in the Department of Public Welfare and
private licensed child placing agencies, the juvenile court staff could step
in and help out with social investigations if necessary, and in contested cases
the supplementary investigation which could be made by juvenile court
personnel would be invaluable to the judge.
Then, too, the experience of a judge who specializes in children's cases
would be brought to bear on adoption proceedings.
Children's cases belong in a children's court, and the juvenile court
should be given jurisdiction of proceedings for the adoption of children of
juvenile court age, either concurrently with circuit courts or cxclusively.
ENFORCEMENT AND MODIFICATION OF DECREES FOR SUPPORT OF CHILDREN
ENrE RED flY CIRCUIT COURTS
Circuit judges in various circuits where separate juvenile courts exist,
notably in the counties of Broward, Duval, and Polk, have felt an inadequacy
in the circuit court's procedure for supervising and enforcing payment of
support money for children under decrees of divorce and separate mainten-
ance. They have sought to improve this situation by including in their
decrees a provision that the payment of support money shall be made
94. FLA. STAT. §§ 72.07-72,25 (1949), derived from Fla. Laws 1943, c. 21759; Fla.
Laws 1943, c. 21951; as amended by Fla. Laws 1947, c. 23721.
95. FLA. STAT. §§ 72.31-72.39 (1949), derived from Fla. Laws 1947, e. 23891.
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through the juvenile court, usually under the authority of some special act
purporting to sanction this practice.
In some respects this practice has proved to be beneficial. At least,
an accurate record of payments is kept, virtually eliminating the recurring
argument between ex-spouses and legally separated spouses as to how they
stand financially.
But in the ultimate analysis there is only a limited improvement, for if
payments are not made the woman must still go back to the circuit court
with her petition for a rule to show cause, and the expensive, time-consum-
ing sparring involved in pleadings, repeated hearings and so forth takes
place, with results unsatisfactory to everyone including the attorneys for
the parties, who can seldom obtain fees commensurate with the time and
effort involved. In effect, the juvenile court merely performs a function
which could be as well or better performed by an extra deputy clerk or so in
the office of the clerk of the circuit court.
If circuit judges really desire a more effective method of relieving them-
selves of this onerous follow-up process, it might be well to consider empow-
ering the juvenile court to take over the enforcement and modification of
circuit court decrees for the support of children.
In addition to the question of the desirability of such a procedure,
consideration would have to be given to its constitutionality. The power of
circuit courts to grant divorces is purely statutory, 8 but there is consider-
able disparity of view as to whether the power of circuit courts to make
orders respecting the custody and support of children is inherent in courts
of equity, or merely incidental to the statutory power to grant divorces. In
Florida, circuit courts have statutory power to make orders relating to the
custody and support of children of the marriage in connection with divorce
cases. If this power is also inherent in equity courts, and if circuit courts
have "exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases in equity" rather than "exclu-
sive original jurisdiction in all cases in equity not cognizable by inferior
courts", 7 the question arises as to whether such a grant of jurisdiction to
juvenile courts would be constitutional.
ODDS AND ENDS
At present, a child aged six to twenty-one who is blind, deaf or dumb
96. 17 AM. JUR., Divorce and Separation § 7, 242, 243, 513, 674 and 697 (1938);
McCowin v. McGowin, 122 Fla. 394, 165 So. 274 (1936); Minick v. Minick, IIl Fla.
469, 149 So. 483 (1933); Duke v. Duke, 109 Fla. 325, 147 So. 588 (1933); Meloche v.
Meloche, 101 Fla. 659, 133 So. 339, 140 So. 319 (1931); Chisholm v. Chisholm, 98 Fla.
1196, 125 So. 694 (1929); Chaires v. Chaires, 10 Fla. 308 (1863). The power to grant
divorces is conferred on circuit courts as equity courts by FLA. SArT. § 65.01 (1949), and
could similarly be conferred on domestic relations courts concurrently or exclusively.
97. FLA. CoNsr. Art. V, § 11, gives circuit courts "exclusive original jurisdiction in
all cases in equity, also in all cases at law, not cognizable by inferior courts." This lan-
guage, with the comma after the word "law", appears to contemplate that inferior courts
may be given some equity jurisdiction, just as several types of inferior courts have been
given jursdiction in cases at law, but the writer has been unable to find any decision of
our supreme court on the point, possibly because the legislature has not yet attempted to
give any equity jurisdiction to any inferior court.
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is admitted to the Florida School for the Deaf and Blind for education, care
and maintenance upon certificate of the board of county commissioners of
his home county that he is so handicapped.98 Inasmuch as the school is not
supported by county tax funds, and the board of county commissioners has
no facilities at all for investigating whether a particular child is actually so
handicapped, or whether the child's parents are financially able to pay the
school for the child's necessary expenses, it would seem more logical to have
this certification made by the juvenile court judge. r'Ilose who favor this
amendment point out that the juvenile court now certifies crippled children
to the Florida Crippled Children's Commission for surgical and medical
care, certifying to the financial inability of the parents to pay for the care
and treatment of the child."
A somewhat similar situation is presented by the procedure for com-
mitment by the county judge of epileptic and feeble-minded children to
the Florida Farm Colony for Epileptic and Feeble-Minded. 100 However,
admissions to this institution are not limited to children, and the procedure
involved is similar to that employed in commitments of insane persons to
the Florida State Hospital.10' Because of these considerations, the argu-
ment in favor of transferring the commitment power to juvenile courts is
not as strong.
CONCLUSION
We now have in operation a sound, conservative, workable, basic
juvenile court law, designed to meet more effectively and less expensively
the permanent problem of juvenile delinquency, and to continue to meet
with dubious effectiveness the permanent problem of neglected children.
In the coming year and a quarter before the 1953 legislative session
begins, the lawyers and people of Florida should closely observe the workings
of the juvenile courts in each county, insure that they are adequately financed
to do the job assigned to them, and be on the look-out for any "bugs" in
the new law which may become apparent, so that it may be perfected by
amendments if necessary.
At the same time, consideration should be given to the desirability of
extending juvenile court jurisdiction beyond the scope of the present basic
law, so that these socio-legal courts can fulfill more completely the function
of children's courts in twentieth century society.
98. FLA. STAT. §§ 242.34, 242.35 (1949).
99. FLA. STAT. § 391.07 (1949).
100. FLA. STAT. § 393.11 (1949).
101. FLA. STAT. § 394.21 (1949).
